Johnson 2014a - Revision history

Scipediacontent at 14:28, 21 January 2021

2021-01-21T14:28:22Z

Scipediacontent: Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 358535639 to Johnson 2014a

2020-10-14T13:11:04Z

Scipediacontent moved page Draft Content 358535639 to Johnson 2014a

Scipediacontent: Created page with " == Abstract == Cyber-attacks can have a devastating impact on safety-critical systems. The increasing reliance on mass market Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) infrastructures..."

2020-10-14T13:11:01Z

Created page with " == Abstract == Cyber-attacks can have a devastating impact on safety-critical systems. The increasing reliance on mass market Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) infrastructures..."

New page

== Abstract ==

Cyber-attacks can have a devastating impact on safety-critical systems. The increasing reliance on mass market Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) infrastructures, including Linux and the IP stack, have created vulnerabilities in applications ranging from Air Traffic Management through to Railway signalling and Maritime surveillance. Once a system has been attacked, it is impossible to demonstrate that malware has been completely eradicated from a safety-related network. For instance, recent generations of malware use zero day exploits and process injection with command and control server architectures to circumvent existing firewalls and monitoring software. This creates enormous problems for regulators who must determine whether or not it is acceptably safe to resume operations. It is, therefore, important that we learn as much as possible from previous cyber-attacks without disclosing information that might encourage future attacks. This chapter describes different architectures for encouraging the exchange of lessons learned from security incidents in safety-critical applications.

Document type: Part of book or chapter of book

== Full document ==
<pdf>Media:Draft_Content_358535639-beopen731-4500-document.pdf</pdf>

== Original document ==

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

* [http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC2013/cyberincident.pdf http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC2013/cyberincident.pdf]

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:28, 21 January 2021
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	Cyber-attacks can have a devastating impact on safety-critical systems. The increasing reliance on mass market Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) infrastructures, including Linux and the IP stack, have created vulnerabilities in applications ranging from Air Traffic Management through to Railway signalling and Maritime surveillance. Once a system has been attacked, it is impossible to demonstrate that malware has been completely eradicated from a safety-related network. For instance, recent generations of malware use zero day exploits and process injection with command and control server architectures to circumvent existing firewalls and monitoring software. This creates enormous problems for regulators who must determine whether or not it is acceptably safe to resume operations. It is, therefore, important that we learn as much as possible from previous cyber-attacks without disclosing information that might encourage future attacks. This chapter describes different architectures for encouraging the exchange of lessons learned from security incidents in safety-critical applications.		Cyber-attacks can have a devastating impact on safety-critical systems. The increasing reliance on mass market Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) infrastructures, including Linux and the IP stack, have created vulnerabilities in applications ranging from Air Traffic Management through to Railway signalling and Maritime surveillance. Once a system has been attacked, it is impossible to demonstrate that malware has been completely eradicated from a safety-related network. For instance, recent generations of malware use zero day exploits and process injection with command and control server architectures to circumvent existing firewalls and monitoring software. This creates enormous problems for regulators who must determine whether or not it is acceptably safe to resume operations. It is, therefore, important that we learn as much as possible from previous cyber-attacks without disclosing information that might encourage future attacks. This chapter describes different architectures for encouraging the exchange of lessons learned from security incidents in safety-critical applications.
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−	~~Document type: Part of book or chapter of book~~
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−	~~== Full document ==~~
−	~~<pdf>Media:Draft_Content_358535639-beopen731-4500-document.pdf</pdf>~~


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	* [http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC2013/cyberincident.pdf http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC2013/cyberincident.pdf]		* [http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC2013/cyberincident.pdf http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/ISSC2013/cyberincident.pdf]
		+
		+	* [http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7 http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7],
		+	: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7]
		+
		+	* [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7],
		+	: [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7/fulltext.html https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-08819-8_7/fulltext.html],
		+	: [https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2182899594 https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2182899594]

← Older revision	Revision as of 13:11, 14 October 2020
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